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	<title>Comments for Infosanity&#039;s Blog</title>
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	<link>http://blog.infosanity.co.uk</link>
	<description>Offensive and Defensive IT Security</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2010 15:10:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>Comment on Month of PHP bugs 2010 by LornaJane</title>
		<link>http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/2010/02/28/month-of-php-bugs-2010/#comment-266</link>
		<dc:creator>LornaJane</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2010 15:10:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/?p=525#comment-266</guid>
		<description>Thanks for the mention and for the call to action, I hope there will be many contributions to the month of security initiative!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for the mention and for the call to action, I hope there will be many contributions to the month of security initiative!</p>
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		<title>Comment on Direct Access at NEBytes by Andrew Waite</title>
		<link>http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/2010/02/17/direct-access-at-nebytes/#comment-251</link>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Waite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2010 17:59:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/?p=496#comment-251</guid>
		<description>Thanks guys, guess I better keep an open mind.

Zac, I think there could be a scarier scenario if a malicious user gets access to the proxy: telling all remote machines to wipe/lock-out next time they have a network connection. How confident are you that all remote users are fully backed up?

AG, I do like that the default is to restrict access to everything by default, but I don&#039;t think that this will necessarily help an organisations security posture over VPNs. I&#039;ve seen just as many VPNs allow full access between &#039;trusted&#039; locations running on devices with a default deny policy as those with default allow. 

It won&#039;t take long before there are plenty of how-to guides suggesting allow everything to get it working with a largely ignored footnote suggesting that you lock access down to suite your specific environment. Experience makes me pessimistic, an environment will only be as secure as the admin makes and most (rightly or wrongly) seem focus on getting functionality working first over security. Hopefully time will prove me wrong.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks guys, guess I better keep an open mind.</p>
<p>Zac, I think there could be a scarier scenario if a malicious user gets access to the proxy: telling all remote machines to wipe/lock-out next time they have a network connection. How confident are you that all remote users are fully backed up?</p>
<p>AG, I do like that the default is to restrict access to everything by default, but I don&#8217;t think that this will necessarily help an organisations security posture over VPNs. I&#8217;ve seen just as many VPNs allow full access between &#8216;trusted&#8217; locations running on devices with a default deny policy as those with default allow. </p>
<p>It won&#8217;t take long before there are plenty of how-to guides suggesting allow everything to get it working with a largely ignored footnote suggesting that you lock access down to suite your specific environment. Experience makes me pessimistic, an environment will only be as secure as the admin makes and most (rightly or wrongly) seem focus on getting functionality working first over security. Hopefully time will prove me wrong.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Direct Access at NEBytes by Zac</title>
		<link>http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/2010/02/17/direct-access-at-nebytes/#comment-250</link>
		<dc:creator>Zac</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2010 16:31:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/?p=496#comment-250</guid>
		<description>I agree with AG, the call home feature is pretty handy for a network admin.  It appears to not allow access to any network resources, but WILL take policy changes and you can force a patch, trace, or wipe.  Haha, the only bad thing from a Pen Tester standpoint is if I can gain access to the proxy, I could now probably write a login policy that gives me access to, or even sends me, data from the victim laptop.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree with AG, the call home feature is pretty handy for a network admin.  It appears to not allow access to any network resources, but WILL take policy changes and you can force a patch, trace, or wipe.  Haha, the only bad thing from a Pen Tester standpoint is if I can gain access to the proxy, I could now probably write a login policy that gives me access to, or even sends me, data from the victim laptop.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Direct Access at NEBytes by AG</title>
		<link>http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/2010/02/17/direct-access-at-nebytes/#comment-249</link>
		<dc:creator>AG</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2010 15:59:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/?p=496#comment-249</guid>
		<description>One of the key points about it that I took away (and one that I don&#039;t think came across very well), is that the direct access server itself acts as a proxy to the internal systems, so you only get access to what the admin permits. You can secure this server with eg ISA or TMG to harden it.

I had some misgivings too, but the impression I get is that this is actually going to end up being more restrictive than a vpn in many cases, since you need to enable every service you want it to access. Lots of vpns I&#039;ve seen give full access to everything since thats the default and the most convenient, with direct access the default is deny until the admin sets it up.

Some other advantages are that if a computer gets stolen, it will still connect in automatically using the computer account even if the thief doesn&#039;t know the user password to log in. You can then use this to either try and track its location via IP, or perform a remote wipe. In most cases the thief won&#039;t be aware this is going on until its too late.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One of the key points about it that I took away (and one that I don&#8217;t think came across very well), is that the direct access server itself acts as a proxy to the internal systems, so you only get access to what the admin permits. You can secure this server with eg ISA or TMG to harden it.</p>
<p>I had some misgivings too, but the impression I get is that this is actually going to end up being more restrictive than a vpn in many cases, since you need to enable every service you want it to access. Lots of vpns I&#8217;ve seen give full access to everything since thats the default and the most convenient, with direct access the default is deny until the admin sets it up.</p>
<p>Some other advantages are that if a computer gets stolen, it will still connect in automatically using the computer account even if the thief doesn&#8217;t know the user password to log in. You can then use this to either try and track its location via IP, or perform a remote wipe. In most cases the thief won&#8217;t be aware this is going on until its too late.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Virtual lab machines by Metasploit Unleashed running on OS X &#124; Phenotyne</title>
		<link>http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/2009/10/12/virtual-lab-machines/#comment-248</link>
		<dc:creator>Metasploit Unleashed running on OS X &#124; Phenotyne</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2010 05:28:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://infosanity.wordpress.com/?p=270#comment-248</guid>
		<description>[...] I was taking a look at a blog the other day by Andrew Waite and saw him talk about a great little tutorial on Metasploit by the guys at Offensive Security. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] I was taking a look at a blog the other day by Andrew Waite and saw him talk about a great little tutorial on Metasploit by the guys at Offensive Security. [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on Direct Access at NEBytes by Andrew Waite</title>
		<link>http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/2010/02/17/direct-access-at-nebytes/#comment-247</link>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Waite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2010 15:59:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/?p=496#comment-247</guid>
		<description>Hi Zac,

thanks for giving me your take on DA, I always like to hear what others think, especially on a topic where my own knowledge is limited. There wasn&#039;t a demo of the technology last night so I didn&#039;t have the chance to actually see it running I can kind of see the appeal from an ease of use perspective, but I&#039;m not sure what is so complicated about the current solutions (VPN, etc.). Likewise, I can see the appeal of better management of the remote systems. 

Everything is a trade-off between usability, price and security, my personal feeling at this point is that it trades too much security for not enough gain, but I am a paranoid security guy. But unfortunately I&#039;m starting to agree with you, as security usually takes a back seat to usability and the &#039;shiny&#039; factor this could take off, for better or worse.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Zac,</p>
<p>thanks for giving me your take on DA, I always like to hear what others think, especially on a topic where my own knowledge is limited. There wasn&#8217;t a demo of the technology last night so I didn&#8217;t have the chance to actually see it running I can kind of see the appeal from an ease of use perspective, but I&#8217;m not sure what is so complicated about the current solutions (VPN, etc.). Likewise, I can see the appeal of better management of the remote systems. </p>
<p>Everything is a trade-off between usability, price and security, my personal feeling at this point is that it trades too much security for not enough gain, but I am a paranoid security guy. But unfortunately I&#8217;m starting to agree with you, as security usually takes a back seat to usability and the &#8217;shiny&#8217; factor this could take off, for better or worse.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Direct Access at NEBytes by Zac</title>
		<link>http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/2010/02/17/direct-access-at-nebytes/#comment-246</link>
		<dc:creator>Zac</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2010 15:20:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/?p=496#comment-246</guid>
		<description>I was attending a Microsoft event last year and also was really interested in the Direct Access setup.  The guy talked on it briefly in the talk, but it was still pretty new at the time so didn&#039;t hit on it much.  So after wards I managed to get a few moments with him and played with it a bit more.

As far as ease of use and streamlining into the OS I couldn&#039;t be more impressed.  It would also blow holes in a firewall trying to figure out a connection.  I am not sure what all security settings they had setup, but it would honestly tunnel out to &#039;home&#039; on any open port it could find.  You could even close ports as it was running and it would dynamically switch to an open port, even going out on 80 if it had to.

The one thing that he said is that it honestly allowed administrators more control of the roaming machine since settings could be changed on the fly anytime it connected.  It also allowed more seamless integration with the home network since it would map drives, printers, and even let you use internal DNS requests.

But like you all I could think of was this was pretty much running a split tunnel, allowing the attacker to access the laptop then have free reign of the home network.  Granted you can limit access to subnets, devices, and all of that, but once you start limiting things it no longer becomes seamless to the user and they will complain.

I honestly think it will take off.  People like ease of use, and from what I could tell DA sure made that possible.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I was attending a Microsoft event last year and also was really interested in the Direct Access setup.  The guy talked on it briefly in the talk, but it was still pretty new at the time so didn&#8217;t hit on it much.  So after wards I managed to get a few moments with him and played with it a bit more.</p>
<p>As far as ease of use and streamlining into the OS I couldn&#8217;t be more impressed.  It would also blow holes in a firewall trying to figure out a connection.  I am not sure what all security settings they had setup, but it would honestly tunnel out to &#8216;home&#8217; on any open port it could find.  You could even close ports as it was running and it would dynamically switch to an open port, even going out on 80 if it had to.</p>
<p>The one thing that he said is that it honestly allowed administrators more control of the roaming machine since settings could be changed on the fly anytime it connected.  It also allowed more seamless integration with the home network since it would map drives, printers, and even let you use internal DNS requests.</p>
<p>But like you all I could think of was this was pretty much running a split tunnel, allowing the attacker to access the laptop then have free reign of the home network.  Granted you can limit access to subnets, devices, and all of that, but once you start limiting things it no longer becomes seamless to the user and they will complain.</p>
<p>I honestly think it will take off.  People like ease of use, and from what I could tell DA sure made that possible.</p>
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		<title>Comment on NEBytes Launch Event by Direct Access at NEBytes &#171; Infosanity&#39;s Blog</title>
		<link>http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/2010/01/21/nebytes-launch-event/#comment-245</link>
		<dc:creator>Direct Access at NEBytes &#171; Infosanity&#39;s Blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Feb 2010 21:29:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://infosanity.wordpress.com/?p=447#comment-245</guid>
		<description>[...] Andrew Waite Leave a comment Go to comments    Tonight was the second NEBytes event, and after the launch event I was looking forward to it. Unfortunately the turn out wasn&#8217;t as good as the first event, 56 [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Andrew Waite Leave a comment Go to comments    Tonight was the second NEBytes event, and after the launch event I was looking forward to it. Unfortunately the turn out wasn&#8217;t as good as the first event, 56 [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on ReportSpammers.net by Report Spammers &#8212; интерактивный ресурс о спаме &#124; ДайСлово!</title>
		<link>http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/2010/01/28/reportspammers-net/#comment-212</link>
		<dc:creator>Report Spammers &#8212; интерактивный ресурс о спаме &#124; ДайСлово!</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Feb 2010 21:40:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://infosanity.wordpress.com/?p=467#comment-212</guid>
		<description>[...] Ахан появился новый ресурс, бери котором отображается информация об [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Ахан появился новый ресурс, бери котором отображается информация об [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on Starting with Dionaea by Andrew Waite</title>
		<link>http://blog.infosanity.co.uk/2009/11/09/starting-with-dionaea/#comment-210</link>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Waite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Feb 2010 19:52:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://infosanity.wordpress.com/?p=353#comment-210</guid>
		<description>Abhishek,

if I have your setup correct you have Nepenthes/Dionaea is running on the laptop, with the modem routing any traffic (or specific ports) from it&#039;s external interface to the IP address of the honeypot service running on the laptop? Assuming my understanding is correct then you should have the setup correct. 

Have you tested your Nepenthes/Dionaea installations locally to remove the network from the equation? Either from a second machine, or the laptop itself, can you communicate with the emulated services? and can the honeypot log this interactions?

Can you confirm that the port forwarding configuration correct? From an external location will traffic directed to your modem&#039;s external IP address be routed through to your laptop. A simple test to take the honeypot configuration from the equation would be to setup a listening netcat session on your laptop and try to connect from an external location, assuming the connection is successful anything typed on one side of the connection should be echoed to the other. If this does not work then hopefully your modem&#039;s logs should aid in tracking down the issue, although depending on device your mileage may vary.

Finally depending on your connection, your ISP may be filtering some inbound traffic to your IP address, mostly in an effort to protect &#039;normal&#039; users from the kind of malicious activity monitored by the honeypot. Unfortunately if this is the case then no amount of configuration on your end will resolve the issue. If this is the case then you may be able to get the restrictions removed by contacting the network support team by your provider, but again your mileage may vary.

Hope this helps, happy honeypotting</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Abhishek,</p>
<p>if I have your setup correct you have Nepenthes/Dionaea is running on the laptop, with the modem routing any traffic (or specific ports) from it&#8217;s external interface to the IP address of the honeypot service running on the laptop? Assuming my understanding is correct then you should have the setup correct. </p>
<p>Have you tested your Nepenthes/Dionaea installations locally to remove the network from the equation? Either from a second machine, or the laptop itself, can you communicate with the emulated services? and can the honeypot log this interactions?</p>
<p>Can you confirm that the port forwarding configuration correct? From an external location will traffic directed to your modem&#8217;s external IP address be routed through to your laptop. A simple test to take the honeypot configuration from the equation would be to setup a listening netcat session on your laptop and try to connect from an external location, assuming the connection is successful anything typed on one side of the connection should be echoed to the other. If this does not work then hopefully your modem&#8217;s logs should aid in tracking down the issue, although depending on device your mileage may vary.</p>
<p>Finally depending on your connection, your ISP may be filtering some inbound traffic to your IP address, mostly in an effort to protect &#8216;normal&#8217; users from the kind of malicious activity monitored by the honeypot. Unfortunately if this is the case then no amount of configuration on your end will resolve the issue. If this is the case then you may be able to get the restrictions removed by contacting the network support team by your provider, but again your mileage may vary.</p>
<p>Hope this helps, happy honeypotting</p>
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