Pipal is a tool for quickly and easily analysing password trends across many passwords, created by @digininja and @n00bz. Install (such as it is) is a straightforward affair; download, unpack, run. Standard usage is equally straightforward; ./pipal.rb ;
Download Pipal from here
I’ve not had too much opportunity run the tool myself, as Robin has been quick to release the results of Pipal’s analysis whenever a new breach has been made publicly available, results of this analysis can be found here.
So, trying to find an opportunity to give Pipal a run out, I decided to take a look at the passwords gathered by my Kippo installation. First up, I decided to take a look at the passwords used with added accounts once intruders compromise the system. Curious to see if the passwords chosen by those that break systems are vulnerable to the same weaknesses of standard users. This password list is quite short, so I’ll just add below:
The full results of this analysis is available here.
Pipal’s output from the analysis can be found here. I was surprised with some of the findings, >;60% of the passwords were 8 characters or less, many based on dictionaries words and only one utilising non-alphanumeric characters. Considering the people choosing these passwords gained access to the server by taking advantage of weak root password, I’d really expect better awareness of the importance of generating strong passwords. Guess not…..
Next up, I wanted to take a look at the passwords that are being used by bruteforce and scanning attempts to gain access to the honeypot installation. This password list is far longer than the list above, totalling 382374 entries. The full list input file is available here, and was generating by running the below SQL query against Kippo’s database. For the purposes of this analysis I decided to ignore authentication attempts that use blank passwords, but for the curious, attempts with passwords number 244062 attempts.
select count(password) from auth where password ;”";
For those not familiar with Kippo, it’s worth noting that it’s default root password (which I stuck with for this analysis) is ’123456′, this will definitely have had an impact on the results below; partly because it features more prominently as attackers knowing the password confirm and utilise the the credentials, and bruteforce scanners will (may?) stop their attack once valid credentials are found, so that attempts which would have been made after ’123456′ are not seen by the Kippo sensor.
The full output from Pipal from this analysis can be found here. Whilst the advice is weaker than ‘best practice’ advice on creating secure passwords, this data set indicates that simply choosing a password with 10 or more characters will avoid more 80% of remote password cracking attempts (local, offline attacks will be a different matter so take with a pinch of salt.
From finally getting my hands dirty with Pipal it’s a great tool, that does exactly what it sets out to do; give the users the numbers, so they can tell the story of the dataset.
Very quick post to highlight a process for clearing all entries from your pass.db file. I had thought that this would take a bit of quick scripting utilising the list and remove modes from the passdb.py utility script. Turns out it’s even easier; simply pass a non-existent file to passdb.pyass.db parameter and it’ll create a fresh database file, no questions asked.
/opt/kippo/utils/passdb.py /opt/kippo/data/idontexistyet.db add testpassword
Will create a new database file with a single entry of ‘testpassword’ (this can be removed once you’ve established everything works). N.B. even with a blank pass.db, kippo will provide access to the password(s) configured in kippo.cfg.
Not sure yet if clearing the database will net any interesting results, only time will tell…..
After a few weeks running my daily Kippo review script I’ve noticed that whilst I’m still mostly receiving several logins per day, it’s rare for a connection to actually interact with my emulated system. (For those new here, Kippo is a medium interaction honeypot emulating an SSH daemon, get started here). So I started trying to investigate what was causing the trend.
One of Kippo’s features is the password database. Basically once an intruder gains access to the shell if they try to change the password or add a different account the system adds the password to the list of allowed. This then allows connections to log into the shell with the new password. Kippo ships with a small utility script to interact with the password database:
@kippo01:/opt/kippo-svn/utils$ ./passdb.py Usage: passdb.py <pass.db> <add|remove|list> [password]
My pass.db file contains 26 entries added by malicious ‘users’; I’m still analysing the contents in detail, but it looks like the Bad Guys(tm) are paying attention to user education 101 and using long, complex passwords.
Using the password used to log into the system, I’ve had a new (to me) way to link disparate logins. For example the query below linked connections spanning two months, originating from multiple source IP address, across three different continents (according to WHOIS records).
Source IPs for same user (based on pass)
SELECT sessions.id AS Session, sessions.ip AS Source, auth.password AS Password, auth.timestamp AS Time FROM sessions, auth WHERE sessions.id = auth.session AND auth.success = 1 AND auth.password = 'mariusbogdan';
Similarly I looked for a connection between multiple successful logins from the same source IP address. The query below provided a list of report offenders:
Successful logins from same source
SELECT COUNT(sessions.ip) AS Num, sessions.ip AS Source FROM sessions, auth WHERE auth.success = 1 AND auth.session = sessions.id GROUP BY sessions.ip ORDER BY COUNT(sessions.ip) desc LIMIT 25;
My summary from this is that Kippo is receiving a lower level of ‘interesting’ connections the longer the system is operational, as attackers login to check if they’ve maintained access to an ’0wned’ resource, without utilising the resource. I’m intending to clear my pass.db to remove existing access; hopefully this will return to more interesting connections and I’m also curious to see if any of my current tenants return from either the same source location(s) and/or re-using passwords (and proving me wrong with previous comment about user education).
When I first started running Kippo almost a year ago I had no difficulty getting motivated to log into the honeypot, check for new connections and generally get a feel for what my
victims visitors have been up to. As time went by, sessions started to follow familiar patterns and some days would get no hits. Slowly I’d check the logs less frequently, and when I did I’d get an ever increasing backlog to review, decreasing my motivation further.
Recently I got annoyed with myself, my system was ticking along in the background but I was gaining no benefit from it. So in a moment of madness I dusted off my bash and built a quick script to provide a daily review of activity on my system. Essentially this does two things, lists session interaction and files downloaded within the last 24hours.
I’ve had the routine running daily for around a week; for days there was minmal activity on my system, either no logins at all, or logins with immediate disconnects. Today was different, and marked the first success of the script. Delivered to my morning inbox, along with the rest of my regular quick tasks and RSS feed as an interesting session. Malicious user connects, downloads a scanner (archive contents looks like gosh), an irc bot (looks like EnergyMech derivative); and when attempts to run toolkit fail, downloads and runs three (yes, three, paranoia is strong with this one) log cleaners.
Example (snipped) output:
:~$ /opt/kippo-svn/kippo-sessions.sh ***Sessions*** ---START:/opt/kippo-svn/log/tty/20110519-220029-5503.log--- www-dev:~# w 22:00:38 up 14 days, 3:53, 1 user, load average: 0.08, 0.02, 0.01 USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT root pts/0 18.104.22.168 22:00 0.00s 0.00s 0.00s w <SNIP> ***DOWNLOADS*** /opt/kippo-svn/dl/20110519220445_http___eduteam_home_ro_mech_gz: gzip compressed data, from Unix, last modified: Sun Oct 4 17:46:52 2009 <SNIP>
Running through my morning routine of catching up with email, twitter, etc. I came across this post showing Sequal7′s first hits on a Kippo installation. In addition to making amusing reading, it gave me a nudge to check back on the InfoSanity Kippo sensor. Initially I was looking to see if the same individual had stumbled across my sensor; they hadn’t at least not from the information I have available.
However, when checking if the newly changed password matched anything in my database I found a new ‘realm’ entry in the ‘input’ table, ‘ssh’. This got me curious, one of my ‘guests’ decided to hit another system whilst logged in to mine; ssh’ing to another IP, accepting the certificate and providing the password to said system (I’m assuming).
It should also be worth noting that by this point the user had already failed to notice that input hadn’t returned to their own system. After (attempting) to change my sensor’s root password (to ‘yahoo’, really) the user exited, but was caught out by Kippo’s trick of clearing the terminal and changing prompt to ‘localhost’, in total I viewed a ~20 minute terminal session of the user trying to compromise other systems, and failing in the same manner.
My assumption is that the user was running through a list of vulnerable systems identified by SSH scanners similar to the kit I wrote about earlier (it wasn’t the same gosh.tgz kit, but first glance shows similar functionality). From this I feel it’s safe to assume that the systems connected to in the logs available are those of other (probably 0wned) systems, rather than anything connected to my guest. Likewise it is probable that the source connection is also a compromised third party rather than belonging to by guest.
For the curious, archive contents:
Whilst investigating the individual exploits and files; I came across this post, indicating ‘my’ archive is a known fire and forget post exploit kit. Here be Skiddies…
As proven by the logs generated by Kippo honeypot sensors have shown, attacks against SSH services are regularly seen in the wild. Even if you follow best practices for securing the service, the malicious scans will utilise resources available to your environment; CPU, bandwidth etc. In sufficient volume legitimate operation may be impacted as the server rejects failed login attempts.
This is where utilities like Breakinguard come into their own. Basically Breakinguard monitors log files for signs of malicious activity, and once a single source has triggered enough alerts blocks all connections from the source location. Other utilities (most notably fail2ban) perform the same activities, but I’m partial to Breakinguard due to it’s small size and simple configuration (and from knowing the author ).
Installation is straightforward, and for the most part automated. Once downloaded and extracted installation is handled by the configure script. On Debian based systems this will install the pre-requisite Perl modules and transfer the utilities components to the standard locations:
- breakinguard script – /usr/local/sbin/breakinguard
- config – /etc/breakinguard.conf
- init script – /etc/init.d/breakinguard
Once installed you need to edit your configuration. The breakinguard.conf file is fairly self explanatory, I normally edit:
- $alert_email -> set to the email address that you want to receive notifications of blocked attacks. On a publicly accessible system these alerts can be high volume, you may want to use a specific email account or at least setup some auto-move rules in your email client to avoid your inbox being spammed.
- $number_of_attempts -> This specifies the number of malicious log entries need to be generated by a specific IP address before the source is blocked. Due to the timing of the Breakinguard route this isn’t always an exact science, the default of 5 does a good job of avoid false positives whilst still blocking an attack in it’s infancy.
- $log_to_watch -> selects the logfile to monitor for signs of malicious activity. /var/log/auth.log is the obvious choice on a Debian based system.
- @safe_ips -> This array allows you to specify a number of trusted networks that will not be blocked, regardless of the number of times the they trigger alerts in the logs. This is useful for insuring that you don’t get locked out of your own systems in the event your keyboard ‘breaks’. On higher end systems with hardware remote management systems (iLo, DRAC, etc.) or virtual systems that provide remote access to the ‘physical’ console I leave this list to local subnet only and use the alternative options to access the server if I do lock myself out.
- $DEBUG -> set to 1 by default, this runs the utility in test mode without actually blocking malicious sources, perfect for testing configuration before going live. Once you’re good to set set $DEBUG to 0 and wait for the attacks to start. Example testing in debug mode is below:
Blocking and unblocking of malicious sources is handled via iptables. Once the $number_of_attempts limit is hit Breakinguard will run the $block_command (configurable in /etc/breakinguard.conf) which by default is ‘/sbin/iptables -I INPUT -s %s -j DROP’, with %s being replaced with the attacking IP. After a configurable timeout ($block_length), the $unblock_command removes the restriction.
You can see the IP addresses currently blocked as they are listed in /var/run/breakinguard/, alternatively listing the current iptables configuration will show sources currently being blocked, for example:
Download Breakinguard here
<UPDATE>Live download mirror: carnivore.it</UPDATE>
Mercury Live DVD was initially (I believe) announced in a post to the Nepenthes Mailing list. It is a remastered Ubuntu distribution with pre-installed honeypot applications and malware analysis tools created by John Moore. From the ReadMe:
This live DVD is a remastered version of Ubuntu 10.0 Beta LTS x86_32. It was designed due to my being disappointed with another reverse engineering malware live CD that was released recently. I have decided to call my creation MERCURY, which is an acronym for Malware Enumeration, Capture, and Reverse Engineering.
The Mercury live DVD contains tools used for digital forensics, data recovery, network monitoring, and spoofing. It should primarily be used as a honeypot or network monitoring platform as well as a laboratory and teaching aid. There are three honeypots installed – honeyd, nepenthes, and dionaea. Four, if you include netcat.
The majority of the additional applications reside in /opt:
- Dionaea (0.1.0) – Dionaea is a malware collection honeypot focusing primarily on SMB emulation, covered on InfoSanity numerous times before.
- FFP – Fuzzy Fingerprinting is a util to aid SSH MitM attacks.
- Kippo (svn rev.169) – Kippo is an low-medium interaction SSH honeypot, Also covered
- mitm-ssh – Unsurprisingly, a utility for aiding man in the middle attacks against SSH connections.
- Origami & pdftools – Two frameworks for analysing malicious PDF files.
- Volatility – an excellent memory analysis toolkit
- Zerowine-vm – A malware behavior analysis platform. I’ve covered ZeroWine here before, and whilst I find it useful for initial analysis I found it a pain to setup and get running. The fact this works out of the box on Mercury is enough reason alone to keep the .iso handy.
Other tools are installed on the system as started, access from standard locations (/etc, /usr/bin, etc.). I won’t try to list them all, but some highlights include:
- Nepenthes – Dionaea’s predecessor
- Honeyd – Honeypot system, perfect for emulating multiple different systems from one platform. Covered in more depth here.
- John – John the Ripper, password cracker
- ircd-hybrid – irc server daemon, useful for analysis irc-based malware’s interaction with command and control systems.
- Snort – de-facto intrusion detection system.
- Wireshark – Packet capture and network analysis tools.
I could go on, but I’m sure you get the idea.
Setting up a honeypot, and analysing the results, has never been easier. And I’m sure the toolkit’s functionality will also be useful in other scenarios; incident response, general network administration or as a safe learning platform. So what are you waiting for?
N.B. there have been several mirror’s and downloads established, the most reliable download source I’ve used is Markus’ mirror at carnivore.it
This morning I cause myself a problem. Annoyingly it was foreseeable and avoidable, this is my excuse (not great, but I’ll stick to it). But as every problem is merely an opportunity in disguise whist I’m re-building systems I might as well document the process. The original InfoSanity guide for installing Kippo was based off of the latest stable version, but I rapidly migrated to the development SVN on learning of the MySQL logging capabilities, so this guide covers that.
As I’m using a Debian system a lot of the system pre-requisites are packaged, this aren’t all needed immediately but we might as well grab them all at once.
apt-get install subversion #for svn
apt-get install python-twisted python-mysqldb # Python and required modules
apt-get install mysql-server #
Basic Kippo setup
Grab Kippo direct from svn, at time of writing I got version 160. (latest instructions):
svn checkout http://kippo.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/ /opt/kippo-svn
Now we can start the honeypot system:
That’s it, all that is required to get the system running. To confirm you can ssh locally with ssh -p2222 firstname.lastname@example.org, unless you’ve jumped ahead and edited the config, password will be 123456.
Log into MySQL via commanline, assuming you’ve not modified the kippo.cfg database directives build the database:
create database kippo;
grant all on kippo.* to ‘kippo’@'localhost’ identified by ‘secret’;
Next edit the kippo.cfg accordingly you database/user/password and uncomment the [database] configuration directives. REMEBER to uncomment ;[database] line not just the parameters, that has now caught me out twice.
Finally, build the database structure with the script that can be found in <kippo>/doc/sql/:
doc/sql/# mysql -ukippo -psecret kippo < mysql.sql
Restart your Kippo process and you should be good; re-test access to the shell and view the database tables to confirm that logs are being written to the database.
So far my Kippo honeypot installation has recieved a number of successful log ins from maliciuos users, some of which have been helpful enough to provide some tools for further analysis. A lot of the archives which have been downloaded show that the kits have been in use for a while, with some archive timestamps going back as far as 2004 (of course this could simply be an incorrect clock on the machine that created the archive). Picking on the most recent download (2010-07-18) I’ve taken a look at the archive containing gosh.tgz.
The archive was downloaded from linux<dot>hostse<dot>com<slash>gosh<tgz>, system is down at time of writing but take care if attempting to investigate yourself. Before downloading the user checked around the system with commands: w, uname -a and cat /proc/cpuinfo, and archive was downloaded and extracted in /dev/shm/.
Once extracted, the archive contains a number of files:
|1:||ISO-8859 English text, with CRLF line terminators|
|3:||ASCII C++ program text, with CRLF line terminators|
|a:||ISO-8859 text, with CRLF line terminators|
|common:||ASCII C++ program text|
|gen-pass.sh:||Bourne-Again shell script text executable|
|pscan2:||ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.2.5, not stripped|
|scam:||Bourne-Again shell script text executable|
|secure:||Bourne-Again shell script text executable|
|ss:||ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.0.0,stripped|
|ssh-scan:||ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.0.0, stripped|
- Interesting files:
- Files 1 to 5, common and pass_file are password lists, totalling 235,523 potential passwords.
- mfu.txt is a list of IP addresses, mostly in the 22.214.171.124/16 address space.
- pscan2 is a fairly common and generic port scanner.
- scam is a shell script that appears to be the core brains of the toolkit. It essentially looks through scanning a different ranges of IP addresses while periodically emailing the contents of vuln.txt back to it’s master (email@example.com).
- ss: appears to be another scanner used for looking for potential targets.
- ssh-scan: appears to be a Romanian tool from the message provided if run without arguments, according to Google Translate (possibly NSFW), and as you would guess from the file name is a scanner for SSH services.
- vuln.txt is blank in the archive, and will be the output of vulnerable systems located by the scanners.
All told this appears to be a kit for performing further scans for unsecured SSH sessions, and it is likely that a similar kit hosted on a different compromised machine was responsible for identifying my installation in the first place. Kits like this also quickly show the problem with tracking down the malicious user behind an compromise or attempt, it is rare for attacks to be launched from systems that can easily be traced back to the malicious user.
A quick Google search confirms that this kit (and user) has been seen in the wild attacking other systems, this posting on the Shell Person blog writes up the aftermath after a production system was compromised by the same kit.
I’ve been running Kippo for nearly two weeks now (decided to live dangerously and go with SVN version) and have seen some interesting results.
Top 10 most common passwords attempted:
- a (651)
- 123456 (495)
- password (331)
- 12345 (302)
- 123 (224)
- 1234 (169)
- 1 (139)
- 12 (123)
- root (105)
- test (46)
Select count(password), password
where password <> ”
group by password
order by count(password) desc
Top 10 most common username attempted:
- root (8510)
- admin (144)
- test (127)
- oracle (96)
- nagios (49)
- mysql (47)
- guest (43)
- info (42)
- user (41)
- postgres (40)
select count(username), username
where username <>”
group by username
order by count(username)
desc limit 10;
17065 attempts, 48 successful connections. (n.b. results skewed as account has purposefully poor choice of password)
group by success
order by success;
Number of connections per unique IP:
- 126.96.36.199 (5212)
- 188.8.131.52 (1752)
- 184.108.40.206 (1043)
- 220.127.116.11 (848)
- 18.104.22.168 (628)
- 22.214.171.124 (271)
- 126.96.36.199 (238)
- 188.8.131.52 (158)
- 184.108.40.206 (128)
- 220.127.116.11 (113)
select count(ip), ip
group by ip
order by count(ip) desc;
Number of attempts were relatively low IP address, in total 194 different source locations have attempted to access the server, with each typically only making 4 attemtps.
Once exploited a number of attackers have proceeded to download various rootkits and utilities (thanks for these). Nothing too interesting yet, standard rootkit functionality, IRC clients and SSH scanners for further compromise. I still need to analyse some of these in more detail, so watch your RSS feeds for more to come.
One malicious user also attempted to create new user accounts on the server, if you have an account called ‘iony’ with a password of ‘ionyszaa’ then you may want to remove it…
If you’ve got a spare machine and public IP address, give Kippo a shot, setup is realitively easy; I’ve seen some interesting malicious user sessions and it turns out that some of those ’31337 haxxors’ that everyone fears really can’t type.